WA Legal Roundup

Four new opinions out of Div. II today.

Restraint of Delgado

The recent Recuenco decision, which held that the state can't charge and the jury find deadly weapons enhancements then sentence firearms enhancements, applies here.

 

Restraint of Scott

Another Recuenco case.

 

Sch. Dist. Alliance for Adequate Funding of Special Educ. v. State

The alliance wanted to declare Washington's 12.7 percent cap on special education funding unconstitutional. The trial court agreed that it was, but because the alliance had improperly excluded the basic education allocation from its calculations, that it had not proven the statutes unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.

As most are aware, the state constitution has a mandate to "make ample provision for the education of all children residing within its borders, without distinction or preference on account of race, color, caste, or sex." The legislature declared special education part of this constitutional obligation.

The standard for proving beyond a reasonable doubt that it is not adequately funded is proving that you have to rely on levy dollars to supplement what the state is supplying. However, basic education dollars cover all students, including those with limited learning ability, on top of which the state funded special education dollars are placed. Thus, by excluding the basic education dollars, the alliance really had not proven anything other than if those in need had to rely on JUST special education dollars, that those alone would be inadequate.

That is the crux of the overall opinion, however, it provides an excellent overview of the state's special education funding process, for those whose practices entail these suits.

 

State v. Ramos

Ramos was convicted of failing to register, a no no for sex offenders. When he was released, it was prior to sex offender classifications. Ramos, who learned of the change in the law, took it upon himself to register, whereupon the Sheriff's office classified him as Level II. The power to designate was given by statute to the Sheriff's office. However, they didn't provide any direction to the Sheriff's office on HOW to classify, which is a violation of the delegation doctrine:

Here, the sex offender classification statute does not provide any comparable guidance to a local law enforcement agency. At most, RCW 4.24.550(6) instructs a local law enforcement agency to consider offender classifications made by other agencies; however, these prior classifications are not binding on the law enforcement agency. RCW 4.24.550(10). As noted, RCW 4.24.550 itself provides neither standards nor definitions to guide law enforcement agencies in determining an offender's classification. Moreover, even if we were to assume the nonbinding determinations of other agencies provided sufficient guidance to the law enforcement agency, in Ramos's case, there were no such prior assessments for the Thurston County Sheriff's Office to review. By failing to provide criteria or standards, the legislature has delegated full responsibility for defining offenders' risk levels, an element of a felony, to local law enforcement agencies.

This, I'm thinking, will turn the registration system on its head for a bit.

Comments

[Avendora]

Are you saying that in cases like Ramos's, that the local law enforcement is deciding the punishment level of an offender instead of a court of law?

If so, doesn't that create a Due Process claim for the defendant?

[Avendora]

Almost forgot,

Thank your for continuing the coverage of the WA Legal Roundup segment.

It is much appreciated.

[Avendora]

RE: State v. Ramos

After reading this, and studying the Sex Offender RCW's, I came to the conclusion that this could actually bring the Washington State Registry down until the Legislature can fix the law.

Meaning, 4.24.550(6)(b) states that Law Enforcement can "assign risk level classifications to all offenders about whom information will be disseminated". Even level 1's are "disseminated" to other Law Enforcement Officials. Therefore, it's an unconstitutional use of power by the Legislature (failure to define the RCW). And, until they fix it, all assessments are null and void that were done in the manner prescribed in 4.24.550(6)(b).

Your statement that it "...will turn the registration system on its head for a bit..." was an understatement I think.

What's your take on it?

[Biil]

Wouldn't this then invalidate any convictions for "failure to register" under the ever changing new versions of what registration means?

So far as I can tell, Sex Offender registration is the only law that applies retroactively to people convicted prior to the change in laws and never be challeneged as an ex post facto violation.

[Justin Walsh]

Bill, Washington's SVP registration isn't criminal in nature, but civil. The failure to register is criminal for failing to maintain your civil duties, but isn't ex post facto because the violation didn't occur prior to the law being enacted. The classification as an SVP isn't a criminal law, but a civil one, and they are only classified after the effective date of the SVP laws.

Ramos was not convicted of failing to register prior to the date on which the failure to register laws went into place.

[Biil]

Justin, I've heard that argument before but..it's semantic tongue hockey.
CIVIL laws don't appear in RCW 9..those are CRIMINAL statutes.

If you miss one of those dates, you're charged with FAILURE TO REGISTER.
Doesn't matter if you've been registered for 20 years at that time and in full compliance prior to the new non law taking effect.

It's a sentence enhancement and calling a pile of dog crap a rose doesn't make it a rose.

I also saw yesterday that the Indiania State Supreme Court has struck down the Ex Post Facto application of these registration laws.

ANY other law, if altered as to sentencing (and call it whatever you like but registration is a sentence)
The Supreme Court ruled that if registration was not part of the original judgement and sentence, it cannot be imposed at a later date.
Here's the link
http://www.ai.org/judiciary/opinions/pdf/04300901rdr.pdf
I'm not a lawyer and I dont play one on TV but it seems to me that the main reason these registration laws tend to go mostly unchallenged is because you get people 10-25 years later, living a perfectly normal life again with kids, wives, grandkids, jobs, etc...who would never get into this fight because they don't want their name in the paper...thus...the State gets to violate all manner of civil rights with impugnity.

[Biil]

Need to fix typo from previous post..What I meant to say is:
Any other law, if altered as to sentencing, CANNOT be applied retroactively to people who've already been convicted and sentenced under the existing sentencing model.

They've tried to get around this by either calling it CIVIL or calling it ADMINSTRATIVE and that's so much crap.

The Indiania Supreme Court agrees.

Look for people with nothing to lose (those not re integrated into the community over a long period of time) to take this fight back into the courts all over the country...perhaps even the ACLU (whom I loathe most of the time) might also get involved.

[Justin Walsh]

Bill, let me break it down this way. Say you buy big rig in 1975. Then in 1995, the state passes a law classifying your car as a big rig, and says you need to stop at a weigh station. Then you break that law. The classification is civil (or likely administrative), but the crime is criminal and simply references your classification for purposes of determining when the new law has been broken.

On a side note, the SVP civil commitment laws have been upheld by the WA Supreme Court time and time again. It is the same premise as incarcerating a crazy person because they are a danger to themselves and the community under normal civil commitment laws.

[Biil]

The Indiana case is actually of more interest to me since it specifically addresses the registration itself as an ex post facto issue calling it part of a sentence in and of itself.
And that since registration is a sentencing issue, that if it wasn't in the original order of sentence and judgment, it cannot be added after the fact.

Wa State's been skirting this by claiming it's admistrative when that's not even a thin smokescreen.

Something that stops you from getting a job, housing, or being able to live is most definitely egregious enough to be considered sentence enhancement.

In your example, if I bought my car prior to 1995, it's rare to not have already existing vehicles "grandfathered" in under existing law.

I live on property that can't have many things done to it because of it's location...but *I* can because I owned the property before the newer laws went into effect. (I don't live in the People's Republic of King/Sno/Pierce County)