The Prof has moved!!!!!
Given the extraordinary amount of time it takes to do this blog, the prof has enlisted like minded individuals to take on some of the work. He now brings you the PROFS! That's right, plural.
Given the extraordinary amount of time it takes to do this blog, the prof has enlisted like minded individuals to take on some of the work. He now brings you the PROFS! That's right, plural.
Yes, that's right. I will try, in this one post, to catch all the way up with present day. Can he do it? We'll see.
In an attempt to quickly catch up, I will provide a short synopsis of what was missed. Unfortunately, this means that, for those of you that track these sorts of things, you will have to look to see who was involved in what. Only the categories will be noted.
While this does not catch me up all the way...its a great start. More to come tomorrow :)
DIVISION I
Federal Way Sch. Dist. No. 210 v. Vinson
Federal Way School District sought review of a finding that they discharged an employee without cause. The court issued the writ. The court then ruled that the district didn't meet the requirements for review of a district court order and rescinded the writ. Before review, the parties settled. The court of appeals dismissed as moot.
Woo v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.
Claims have different interest rates on the judgment. Because this claim was primarily tortious, the rate for tortious conduct governs.
City of Bellingham v. Belleau Woods Ii, Llc
Land use...nerd! (an ordinance regarding park impact fees).
CrRLJ 8.3(b) allows for dismissal for government misconduct that prejudices the accused. It does not provide expressly for evidence suppression. "We hold suppression of evidence is not an available remedy under CrRLJ 8.3(b). We also hold that the writ is available to correct errors of law and that the superior court erred in denying the writ." 'Nuff said.
Mills was quite the verbally abusive professor. At a closed hearing, he was suspended for two quarters without pay. He argued vagueness of the statute and other free speech issues. The court of appeals held that his free speech rights were not violated and the university violated the APA by performing a closed hearing.
Ch. 10.99 RCW classifies certain crimes as domestic violent crimes. Hagler hooked up with a girl over 20 years his junior, gave her gifts when she let him live there and use her car, and then assaulted her and forced her into prostitution for "repayment". Hagler had asked the court not to inform the jury about the domestic violent designation of the charge. There's nothing in the statute regarding if you should tell the jury this. The designation need not be proven under Blakely. The court stated that, while it is technically not error to do so, that it might result in prejudice in some cases. Thus, it is not advisable to bring the designation in. However, doing so in this case was harmless.
DIVISION II
Rahman was injured as an unauthorized passenger in a state vehicle. Mohammad, an intern and her husband, was asked to travel to Spokane to assist in an inspection and was given a state vehicle to do so. The night before the inspection, Rahman was ill and lonely, and asked her husband to pick her up so she could go with him on the trip. The state policy forbids passengers not on official state business. On the way to Spokane, the car left the roadway, injuring Rahman badly. The issue, of course, comes down to whether the state is vicariously liable for the actions of Mohammad. The trial court ruled that there was not vicarious liability.
Division III looked to McNew v. Puget Sound Pulp & Timber Co., 37 Wn.2d 495, 497-98, 224 P.2d 627 (1950):
The general trend of authority is in the direction of holding that, where the employee is combining his own business with that of his employer, or attending to both at substantially the same time, no nice inquiry will be made as to which business the employee was actually engaged in when a third person was injured, and the employer will be held responsible unless it clearly appears that the employee could not have been directly or indirectly serving his employer; also the fact that the predominant motive of the employee is to benefit himself does not prevent the act from being within the course or scope of employment, and if the purpose of serving the employer's business actuates the employee to any appreciable extent, the employer is subject to liability if the act otherwise is within the service.
The court also looked to the policy that breaking company policy necessarily renders actions outside of course and scope. Thus, the court rejected the Restatement (Second) of Agency s. 242, which has never been adopted, or even cited, in Washington. As a distinguishing factor, the court noted that Rahman was in the passenger area, not in areas completely unsuitable for passengers (cargo area, runner-boards). The state was vicariously responsible in this case.
Alford pleas, sentencing, and a complex criminal procedural history. Look this one up Crim Law peeps...especially if you work with SVPs. I don't have the time necessary to decipher it for you :(
Allen thought violating a no-contact order somehow fell within double jeopardy. The court did remand for sentencing within the guidelines however.
SSY stomped a kid and took his iPod. He argued merger of the assault with the robbery. The court held that it didn't violate double jeopardy, but remanded for a determination of whether RCW 13.40.180(1) might reduce his sentence.
DIVISION III
If one spouse does not know of a benefit, it can assert a right to that benefit upon finding out, regardless of whether it is one year beyond the entry of dissolution.
The Kinneys alleged a January 2000 contract breach stemming from Cook's using the corporation to which the Kinney's held shares, as a guarantee on a loan to another company Mr. Cook owned. The Kinney's argued the discovery rule as to when they discovered or should have discovered the loan. However, the discovery rule in contracts cases is very limited, and the court refused to extend it beyond the confines of Architechtonics Construction Management, Inc. v. Khorram, 111 Wn. App. 725, 45 P.3d 1142 (2002).
City of Walla Walla v. Ibarra-Raya
Drug house. Drug money taken. Drug convictions reversed. Who gets the money? Because its civil, its still an issue of fact. Of course, any fourth amendment rulings in the criminal case will also apply to the quasi-criminal forfeiture under our Uniform Controlled Substances Act. The rest of the opinion comes down to whether an issue of fact exists, and that part is boring. So I will not talk about it.
WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT
Chadwick Farms Owners Ass'n v. FHC, LLC
Once a certificate of liability is canceled, an LLC cannot be sued. Period.
The State has no duty to defend Justice Sanders when he gets called before the Commission on Judicial Conduct.
For all you securities junkies: "We conclude that Washington follows the Delaware demand futility standard and the reasoning of Ryan."
Intent to inflict great bodily harm transfers to unintended victims under RCW 9A.36.011 (assault in the first degree).
The officer ascertained that the item in Garvin's pants was not a weapon, but squeezed the coin purse until some meath fell out of it in the pocket. The court ruled that this was going beyond the bounds of Terry.
The Prof has been mired in a slew of things. Many motions, much driving, and a project for WSAJ. I will be catching up on Supreme Court and Court of Appeals decisions this weekend, after which I should return to more timely updates.
FINALLY, an email to alumni is released. Though it largely mirrors the email Dean Testy sent out herself:
Dear Alumni,
As you are valued members of the Seattle University School of Law community, I wanted to write immediately to share the news that Dean Kellye Y. Testy has accepted the position of Dean and Mifflin University Professor of Law at the University of Washington School of Law, effective September 2009. A beloved member of the faculty and dean, she has provided inspirational teaching and leadership to hundreds of alumni over the past seventeen years at Seattle University School of Law. We greatly appreciate her service to our law school and wish her the best in her new endeavor.
Thanks to each of you, Seattle University School of Law enjoys unprecedented success, both regionally and nationally. The strong support of alumni, who continue to contribute to the school, its students and programs in so many meaningful ways, has helped us reach new heights and extended recognition. Today we are ranked among the nation’s top law schools, noted for our commitment to academic excellence and education for justice, as reflected in our outstanding faculty teacher-scholars; our #1-ranked Legal Writing Program; and our clinics and institutes, including the newly launched Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality.
Now a community of more than 9,000 alumni, you have helped shape and propel this law school, creating a buzz locally and regionally in addition to growing visibility throughout the U.S. and the world. For this and more, we are extremely grateful as we turn to you for your good counsel, advocacy and support in recruiting a new dean to lead and continue the school’s upward trajectory.
We will keep you apprised as an interim dean and selection committee are named. With plans to appoint a new dean to be in place by July 2010, a national search will begin immediately.
Please know how very much we value and appreciate our alumni community. We were thrilled to see many of you at Alumni Weekend, April 24-25, and hope that you will remain connected, increasingly active and engaged.
With warm best wishes,
Grace Greenwich
Director of Alumni Relations
(206) 398-4600
The following is the email that was sent to current students of the law school (but not alumni):
Dear Students,
At this very exciting and busy time of year, I write to give you some bittersweet news. I will be stepping down as your dean this summer and have agreed to become the next dean at the University of Washington School of Law, effective Sept. 1. While I look forward to the challenge of leading a public institution in these times, it will be difficult for me to leave the law school and the students I am so fond of. I am so proud of the accomplishments of the outstanding students – and future alumni – of Seattle University School of Law. I commend you for your hard work and accomplishments and also thank you for your support. I look forward to celebrating with the Class of 2009 this weekend, and will follow your future success with keen interest.
This is an opportune time for the School of Law to recruit its next dean, having steadily risen in rankings and reputation, and being increasingly known for its outstanding faculty and programs and its commitment to academic excellence and education for justice. I am confident the School of Law is in good hands and will continue to excel under new leadership.
The University will move swiftly to appoint an interim dean and convene a national search for a permanent dean. You will be kept apprised of those developments.
My best wishes to you all, good luck with your summer activities, and please continue to know that you have my strong support if I can assist you as your career develops.
Dean Testy
Dean Kelly Testye has recently announced that she is leaving Seattle University School of Law for the head spot at University of Washington School of Law. The prof will of course update you with details as they become known.
Bless Div. II for only putting out one opinion tonight. And from the looks of it, its criminal. Lets see if that means easy blogging for yours truly:
The trial court wanted to wrap up its day, so it cut off motions in limine for Heath's firearms possession trial, to pick back up in the morning. In the morning, instead of hearing the motions in open court, it heard them in chambers. The judge also allowed jurors to ask questions individually in chambers during voir dire if they felt they'd not be able to see it in open court. However, to do closed proceedings of this nature requires a Bone-Club analysis. State v. Bone Club, 128 Wn.2d 254, 906 P.2d 325 (1995). The state had argued that the right to a public trial belonged to the public. However, the right to a public trial belongs to the accused.
The trial court didn't apply the Bone-Club factors, but here they are for you anyhow:
1. The proponent of closure or sealing must make some showing [of a compelling interest], and where that need is based on a right other than an accused's right to a fair trial, the proponent must show a "serious and imminent threat" to that right.
2. Anyone present when the closure motion is made must be given an opportunity to object to the closure.
3. The proposed method for curtailing open access must be the least restrictive means available for protecting the threatened interests.
4. The court must weigh the competing interests of the proponent of closure and the public.
5. The order must be no broader in its application or duration than necessary to serve its purpose.
Bone-Club, 128 Wn.2d at 258-59.
Judge Hunt, in her dissent, would require the trial court to explicitly close proceedings to the public for a Bone-Club analysis to be implicated. This, of course, would lead only to judge's implicitly closing proceedings. I fail to see how any closer, whether explicit or implicit, isn't a foreclosure on the right to a public trial. Moving a trial to chambers effectively closes it to the public. I wonder if she would so readily allow the public into her chambers?
Curtis walked onto the Lein's dock and her leg went through. The trial court applied res ipsa (the dock was destroyed without an opportunity to inspect). But it refused to summarily hold that the Leins should have known of the defect, only that the defect existed:
Expanding Penson to include the facts in this case would create the potential for premises liability every time a structure fails regardless of whether a defect was discoverable.
Here's my problem with that logic: The dock may have provided evidence that they should have known. If the whole thing was creaky and rotten, logic would dictate they should have known. Then again, that is a pretty strong sanction for the spoliation in this case, especially where the defect is given to the Plaintiff.
Thoughts? I would love to hear from both bars here.
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